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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DAVID R. WARDEN, 
Respondent. 
Case No, 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether there is conflict adequate for Supreme 
Court review when the Court of Appeals in the present criminal 
case reversed a jury verdict for insufficiency of evidence on 
grounds that the evidence was sufficiently inconclusive, viewed 
in a light most favorable to the verdict, such that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted? 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals' application of this 
standard of review presents an important and unsettled question 
of law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court? 
3. Whether this Court should review the Court of 
Appeals1 jury verdict reversal when the State failed to present 
at trial any evidence to establish Dr. Wardenfs degree of 
deviation from the applicable standard of care as is necessary to 
prove criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt? 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Warden, , 122 Utah Adv. Rep, 42, P.2d (Ct. App. 1989), 
appears as Appendix A to this brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to review the decision of 
the Court of Appeals by a writ of certiorari under UTAH CODE ANN. 
78-2-2(5) (Supp.1986). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. Section 76-2-103(4) 
Definition of "criminal negligence or 
criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
* * * 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he ought 
to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that 
an ordinary person would exercise in all 
the circumstances as viewed from the 
actorf s standpoint. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David R. Warden, was charged with Negligent 
Homicide, a class A misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-206 
(1973). The defendant was initially tried by jury in the Second 
Circuit Court, Layton Department, beginning on November 16, 1987; 
however, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18, 1987 due 
to improper testimony given by one of the State's witnesses. A 
second jury trial was held beginning February 22, 1988, which 
continued through February 26, 1988. Defendant was convicted of 
the offense of Negligent Homicide as charged. 
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals and on 
November 22, 1989, the Court ruled by written opinion that the 
conviction should be reversed because of insufficiency of the 
evidence, based upon the State's failure to establish a 
"substantial and unjustifiable risk of death." 
Defendant is a physician having graduated from the 
University of Pennsylvania Medical School in 1964. His 
internship was at Madigan General Hospital, fort Lewis, 
Washington (T. Vol. IV, page 40, lines 8 - 20). After four years 
in the military service, he settled in Kaysville, Davis County, 
Utah, to practice family medicine where he has been ever since 
(Id. at page 43, lines 12 - 20). He was Board certified in 
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family medicine in 1970 and has been until the present time (Id, 
at page 43, lines 22 - 25 and page 44, lines 1 - 13). 
During his practice, Defendant attended approximately 
2500 deliveries, 300 of which were home deliveries (Id. at page 
45, lines 9 - 25). A home delivery patient must be low risk, 
hospital facilities should be near in case of emergency and there 
must be family support for the mother and child following 
delivery (Id. at page 48, lines 1 - 25; page 49, lines 1 - 2 3 ; 
page 240, line 6; page 242, line 11). 
The mother of the deceased child is Joanne Young. She 
lived in Kaysville, Utah, with her parents, Maurice and Ivy 
Young, who are from England having arrived in the United States 
in 1985 (T. Vol. I at page 42, line 19 - page 44, line 7). 
Maurice and Ivy are the parents of seven children (Joanne being 
number 5) all of whom were born in England. Four were home 
deliveries (Id. at page 44, line 24 - page 45, line 3). 
Joanne became pregnant out-of-wedlock in early 1986. 
She thought conception had occurred in March (T. Vol. Ill, page 
40. lines 10 - 15). She told her parents in early summer. 
Thereafter, Joanne and Ivy went to see Dr. Mark Bitner who 
specializes in obstetrics and was officed at the Tanner Clinic in 
Layton, Utah (Id. at page 40, line 10 - page 42, line 18). 
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They visited Dr. Bitner twice - once on June 27 and 
again August 8, 1986 (T. Vol. II, page 173, line 24 - page 174, 
line 4 and page 176, lines 15 - 18). A complete OB exam was not 
performed on the first visit because there was a question about 
payment (Id. at page 174, lines 23 - 25 and page 218, lines 19-
22) because Maurice did not have medical insurance coverage for 
his daughter (Id. at page 148, line 14 - page 150, line 8). 
Nevertheless, Joanne and Ivy returned for the second visit at 
which time a complete OB exam was done. Her pregnancy was 
determined to be normal (low risk) (Id. at page 226, lines 16-
page 228, line 16; T. Vol. Ill, page 202, lines 2 - 4 and T. Vol. 
IV, page 243, line 13 - page 246, line 2) and the date of 
delivery determined to be in early December, 1986. However, Dr. 
Bitner recommended an ultrasound to confirm that finding because 
he was uncertain (T. Vol II at page 219, line 12 - page 220, line 
12) . Joanne never returned for the test. She and her family 
were concerned about the cost of a hospital delivery (T. Vol III, 
page 101, line 1 - page 104, line 3; T. Vol. II, page 149, line 
21 - page 150, line 8 and Id. at page 341, line 7 - page 342, 
line 5). 
Joanne and Ivy decided on a home delivery and asked 
Defendant to attend (T. Vol III, page 49, lines 4 - 15). They 
visited him September 8, 1986 (Id. at page 50, lines 15 - 20). 
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Defendant examined Joanne and assessed her for home delivery. He 
found her to be a suitable candidate and agreed to attend the 
birth of the child (T. Vol. IV, page 51, line 21 - page 59, line 
19) . Defendant confirmed the date of delivery to be early 
December, 1986 fid, at page 57, line 3 - page 58, line 9). He 
saw her again October 6, 1986. The exam did not change his prior 
assessment (Id. at page 60, line 9 - page 63, line 12). 
On the morning of November 7, 1986, Defendant was at 
the University of Utah Football Stadium with the Davis High 
School Football Team as its team physician where they were 
participating in the State Tournament. He was contacted by Ivy 
through his remote telephone and advised that Joanne had awakened 
with some vaginal bleeding evidenced by spotting (T. Vol. IV, 
page 67, line 7 - page 69, line 22; T. Vol. Ill, page 107, line 4 
- page 106, line 18). Both Ivy and Defendant were concerned that 
labor was beginning early. Defendant advised Ivy to keep Joanne 
down and call him about 1:00 p.m. or sooner if the situation 
worsened (T. Vol. II, page 20, line 7 - 23; Vol. IV, page 69, 
line 7 0 page 71, line 5). 
Ivy called again about mid-day and advised Defendant 
that the bleeding had stopped and that John Shaw, the father of 
the child, had said conception may have occurred a month earlier 
which would make Joanne full term (T. Vol. IV, page 71, line 7-
6 
page 73, line 19; Vol. Ill at page 108, line 19 - page 110, line 
20; Vol. II, at page 20, line 20 - page 22, line 21 and Id. at 
page 339, line 4 - page 340, line 3). Defendant advised Ivy to 
call again around 5:00 p.m. if Joanne appeared to be continuing 
with labor (T. Vol. IV, page 73, lines 3 - 19). 
Ivy called late afternoon and advised Defendant that 
Joanne was having occasional contractions. He instructed her to 
call when the contractions were three to five minutes apart (T. 
Vol. IV, at page 74, line 24 - page 75, line 25; T. Vol. I, at 
page 65, line 17 - page 66, line 23 and Vol II, page 25, line 7-
line 23). 
Ivy called Defendant at home about 10:15 p.m. and 
advised that Joanne was in the last stages of labor. Defendant 
arrived at the Young residence at 10:30 p.m. (T. Vol. I, page 67, 
line 2 - page 68, line 18). 
Upon arrival, he met Maurice at the door, went into the 
bedroom, examined Joanne, found that delivery was imminent and 
delivered a male infant at 10:40 p.m. The child presented in a 
breach position and was delivered within one minute without 
difficulty. There was no evidence of untoward bleeding nor was 
the amniotic fluid tinged with blood. The child breathed 
spontaneously without stimulation, had a normal heart rate and 
Defendant assessed the infant as having a one minute and five 
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minute APGAR score of 8 which indicated that the child had good 
potential for sustaining life (T. Vol. IV, page 77, line 17-
page 86, line 5). 
The child was small. Defendant estimated his weight as 
being between 4 - 5 pounds. Defendant thought it was premature 
(T. Vol. IV, page 86, lines 8 - 18). 
Following birth, the child exhibited some symptoms of 
grunting respirations which could be controlled by positioning 
the child. Defendant advised Ivy that perhaps hospitalization 
was indicated. She expressed concern about the expense. 
Defendant thereupon showed Joanne how to nurse the child, 
instructed her on how to keep the child warm and told Ivy that 
she must watch the child during the night regarding his 
temperature, color and respiration and if they worsened to call 
him. Ivy acknowledged the instructions and Defendant left the 
home at about 11:30 p.m. (Id. at page 96, line 13, through page 
105, line 4; Vol. 1, page 85, lines 15 - 18; Vol. Ill, page 122, 
line 12 - page 130, line 11). 
Defendant did not hear from the family until the next 
day about noon when he called the home and was advised the child 
had died. (Id. at page III, line 7 - page 113, line 5). 
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and the child into 
another bedroom where it was warmer. On two occasions, she 
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observed that the child's hands and feet were "very blue" which 
concerned her. About 5:00 a.m. they got the child up and Joanne 
held him. He still appeared blue. They wrapped him in a quilt. 
At 8:00 a.m., the child appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy 
observed the condition and resuscitated him. She did not want 
Joanne to be aware of the situation. Ivy worked with the child 
for approximately 20 minutes (T. Vol. I, page 86, line 17 - page 
97, line 24; Vol. II, page 44, line 14 - page 68, line 11; Vol. 
Ill, page 136, line 7 - 12). 
Ivy called Iris Auger, a friend and neighbor, at about 
8:30 a.m. and told her of the birth and that the child was small. 
Iris recommended that the child be hospitalized. Ivy said they 
were trying to get the doctor. Ivy did not disclose to Iris that 
the child had appeared to have stopped breathing minutes earlier 
nor that there was an emergency (T. Vol. V, page 75, line 15-
page 83, line 3; Vol. V, page 87, line 19 - page 88, line 2). 
Ivy called Defendant's office between 8:30 and 9:00 
a.m. but he was not in. She did not identify herself or report 
any emergency concerning the child. She also called Defendant's 
home but he was not there. Again, she did not identify herself 
or report an emergency. (T. Vol. I, page 95, line 20 - page 97, 
line 23; Vol. II, page 69, line 6 - page 72, line 5; Vol. V, page 
23, line 6 - page 26, line 11). 
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During the night and morning hours Ivy did not contact 
Defendant, did not call the paramedics and did not take the child 
to the hospital notwithstanding the child's deteriorating 
condition (T. Vol. II, page 75, line 14 - page 77, line 11). 
Rather, she called her Bishop in the LDS Church but did not 
advise him of an emergency. The Bishop contacted Frank Kramer, 
M.D., a pediatrician who went to the Young home (T. Vol. V, page 
38, line 2 - page 45, line 3; Vol. II, page 260, line 21 - page 
261, line 25) . 
The Bishop and Dr. Kramer arrived about 10:30 a.m. The 
child appeared lifeless. He was rushed to Humana North Davis 
Hospital where he was pronounced dead at approximately 11:15 a.m. 
(T. Vol. II, page 283, lines 20 - 23; Id. at page 262, line 1-
page 268, line 9). 
A post-mortem examination indicated the child died of 
respiratory distress syndrome (R. at page 69 - 71). 
Defendant was available by telephone during the night 
of November 7th and the morning hours of November 8th. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE ARE NO "SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT" REASONS FOR THIS 
COURT TO REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS1 CAREFULLY 
REASONED DECISION. 
It is clear that this Court has the discretion to 
review the Court of Appeal's decision in this case. However, 
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important interests of justice and judicial economy caution 
against meaningless and repetitive review. This Court's Rule 
suggests that the Court grant petitions for certiorari only when 
there are "special and important reasons therefor." Rule 43, R. 
Utah S. Ct. Since there are no such reasons present in this 
case, the Court should deny the State's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
A. The Court of Appeals1 insufficiency of evidence 
standard of review is identical to the standard 
used by this Court and other Court of Appeals 
panels. 
The State argues that review is appropriate in this 
case because there is conflict between the way this Panel applied 
the standard of review for insufficiency of evidence and the way 
it is applied by this Court and other Panels. However, an 
objective review of the Court of Appeals' decision shows that 
there is in fact no conflict. The State reaches its conclusion 
because of its misunderstanding of the standard of review as 
applied in the Court of Appeal's decision. 
The parties agree on the appropriate standard of review 
for criminal jury verdicts on appeal for insufficiency of 
evidence. The well-established standard was recently restated by 
this Court in State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988). There, 
Justice Howe, writing the opinion of the Court on this point 
stated: 
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In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 
we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and reverse for 
insufficient evidence 'only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was 
convicted.' 
Id. at 593 (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983)). This is the same standard that one Panel of the Court of 
Appeals applied in State v. Tolman, 775 P. 2d 422, 424 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1989) , and was expressly acknowledged by the Panel in the 
present case to be the controlling standard. State v. Warden, 
122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (Ct. App. 1990). 
This standard obviously requires a reviewing court to 
do two important things. First, it must construe the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the verdict. However, the analysis 
does not stop here. The mere fact that some evidence supports 
the verdict is not enough. If it were, it would be the same as 
the standard of review for sufficiency of evidence in a civil 
case. The second important thing the court must do is examine 
that evidence to see if it was so inconclusive that a reasonable 
person could not have found that it proved the elements of the 
crime beyond reasonable doubt. 
This is exactly the procedure the Court of Appeals 
followed in this case. The specific task faced by the court was 
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to determine if the State's evidence was so insufficient that a 
reasonable person must have had a reasonable doubt about whether 
Dr. Warden's conduct was a "gross deviation from the standard of 
care." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-103(4) (1953). The court's opinion 
shows that it expressly approached its task by viewing the facts 
favorable to the verdict. Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44. It 
then carefully summarized the evidence in that fashion. Id. at 
42-43. The court thereupon concluded that "even looking at the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, that 
evidence was 'sufficiently inconclusive' to establish" the 
elements of the crime, id. at 45. 
The State, on the other hand, argues that the court 
based its decision on conflicting evidence that was favorable to 
Dr. Warden. To arrive at this conclusion, the State ignores the 
court's adoption of the correct standard of review and argues, 
that it engaged in sleight of hand, professing one standard but 
relying on another, as if the court had some hidden agenda. To 
bolster its contention, the State parrots the dissent in Warden 
and provides a list of evidence that it claims is favorable to 
the verdict which allegedly contradicts the evidence on which 
the court based its decision. Then, it composes another list of 
inferences it believes can be drawn from the evidence. This 
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demonstrates, the State argues, that the Court of Appeals 
misapplied the standard of review for insufficiency of evidence. 
What causes the State to misinterpret the Court of 
Appeals1 decision, is that the mere existence of a quantum of 
evidence that supports the verdict, however large, is not 
dispositive in a criminal case. The real issue is whether that 
evidence is of a sufficient nature to preclude a reasonable 
person from entertaining reasonable doubt concerning the 
defendant's guilt. Consequently, this Court should not be 
persuaded that the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of 
review simply because the State formulates favorable inferences 
drawn from alleged contradictions between the record and the 
Court of Appeals' opinion. 
There are other reasons why the Court should not be 
convinced by the State's argument. First, any scrupulous review 
of a five-day trial transcript would be certain to reveal minor 
differences in an appellate court's brief summary of the facts. 
If this were a compelling ground for review, this Court would 
arguably have to review every lower court decision and, 
respectfully, rehear many of its own decisions. Second, the 
State has not indicated whether, or how any of these contradic-
tions and inferences, even make a difference; simply 
demonstrating their existence does not indicate that the Court of 
14 
Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to 
prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, this Court 
should respect the Court of Appeals1 conscientious and correct 
application of the proper standard of review, especially when it 
involves the examination of an extensive trial transcript. 
Fourth, the facts in the Court of Appeals1 recitation appear 
chosen simply to demonstrate the court's conclusion that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt, even when viewed favorably to the verdict. There is no 
reason for this Court to subscribe to the State's second-guessing 
of why the Court of Appeals included in its opinion the facts 
that it did, especially when it openly followed the undisputed 
standard of review. 
In summary, the Court of Appeals did not reverse the 
jury verdict merely because there was conflicting evidence but 
because that evidence was not of a sufficient nature to preclude 
reasonable doubt. The mere fact that the State claims a quantity 
of alleged contradictions and inferences does not pose a 
persuasive argument that the Court of Appeals misapplied the 
standard of review. 
B. This case does not involve an important or 
unsettled question of law that should be heard by 
the Supreme Court, 
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As discussed above, the parties to this case agree on 
the controlling standard of review. This standard is well-
settled in Utah, as evidenced by the numerous cases expressing 
language identical to that used by the Court of Appeals below. 
See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 729 P. 2d 610 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Sparks, 672 P.2d 92 (Utah 1983); State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777 
(Utah 1977). Furthermore, the present case does not present any 
novel variation or important questions with respect to that 
standard. Instead, this case revolves around the mechanical 
question of whether the standard was properly applied by the 
Court of Appeals. Nothing of value in the development of the law 
on important and pressing questions will result from further 
review by the Court of this case. The only achievement of 
further review would be another repetition of the already 
familiar standard. This is not a proper use of judicial 
resources. The Court should deny the State's petition. 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL IS INCONCLUSIVE TO SHOW 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DR. WARDENfS CONDUCT 
GROSSLY DEVIATED FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE. 
Even if the Court chooses to disregard the considera-
tions outlined above, the Court should decide that the case on 
its merits does not require further review and deny the State's 
petition. 
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Dr. Warden was charged with criminal negligence. To 
convict him, the State had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
he should have been aware of a "substantial and unjustifiable 
risk" of Jareth Young's death. The State could not meet its 
burden merely by showing that Dr. Warden should have been aware 
of a risk but, rather, had to show that the risk was "of such a 
nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
103(4) (1953) (emphasis added). 
Obviously, expert testimony was required to establish 
the degree and nature of the risk. Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 
at 43-44. Gross deviation from the standard of care would 
necessarily have to be proven by comparing Dr. Warden's actions 
taken in this home delivery context with the actions of other 
home delivery practitioners. In the first place, the State did 
not produce any home delivery practitioners as witnesses. In the 
second place, the Statefs witnesses produced no testimony as to 
the degree of Dr. Warden's deviation from the applicable 
standard of care. Instead, these witnesses, who were adamantly 
opposed to home delivery, only offered their belief that Dr. 
Warden's conduct was outside the standard of care. Without proof 
of the degree of deviation, assuming that the standard of care 
17 
proposed by the State is applicable, the State has proven only 
civil and not criminal negligence. 
By contrast, however, expert testimony for Dr. Warden 
showed that his actions were consistent with the applicable 
standard of care. Dr. Gregory White, a respected home delivery 
practitioner who had delivered approximately 1,000 babies at home 
over forty years, testified repeatedly that Dr. Warden acted 
appropriately. For example, he testified that under these facts 
a home delivery would have been appropriate (T. Vol. IV, p. 246); 
that not doing an ultrasound was acceptable (Xd. at 250) ; that 
hospitalization was not indicated upon the mother's "spotting" 
(Id. at 254) ; that a physical examination was not indicated after 
the mother's cramping and spotting ceased or when she experienced 
15 minute contractions (Id. at 257-59); that Dr. Warden's 
examination of the newborn was adequate and appropriate (Id. at 
2 66-2 69) ; that the examination and prematurity of the baby did 
not indicate immediate hospitalization (Id. at 271) ; that the 
infant's grunting did not demand immediate hospitalization, 
especially when relieved by a change of position (Xd. at 274-75); 
and that it would be appropriate to leave the child in the care 
of its mother and grandmother with instructions to call him upon 
a change of condition (Xd. at 277) . In short, none of Dr. 
18 
Warden's actions deviated from the standard of care applicable to 
a home delivery practitioner. 
The Court of Appeals appears to have agreed that the 
evidence put on by the State was sufficiently inconclusive that a 
reasonable juror must have had a reasonable doubt whether Dr. 
Warden's conduct grossly deviated from the applicable standard of 
care. That was why the verdict was reversed and not just because 
there was conflicting evidence. The court concluded that the 
response of the State's witness to a question about the standard 
of care 
"merely reinforces our conclusion that his 
testimony, as well as that of the other 
experts for the State, must be construed in 
light of the fact that home delivery, though 
legal, is not a widespread practice by 
doctors in Utah. The State's experts 
testified that the medical community in this 
state does not teach or train physicians for 
home delivery and generally recommends 
against it." 
Warden, at 45. 
CONCLUSION 
There are no compelling reasons for the Court to review 
the Court of Appeals' decision. The case does not present any 
novel or important questions of law that have not already been 
decided, and there is no dispute or conflict between panels of 
the Court of Appeals and this Court on the applicable standard of 
review for insufficiency of evidence. 
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Furthermore, the fact remains that without testimony as 
to the degree of Dr. Warden's deviation from the applicable 
standard of care, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Dr. Warden was guilty of criminal negligence. The 
Court of Appeals was therefore correct in reversing his 
conviction for insufficiency of eviden 
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enons hearing, however, by Dr. Alma Carlisle, a 
Utah State Pnson psychologist, negated those the* 
ones. Exclusion of the theories wis, therefore, a 
legitimate trial strategy. 
GStets 
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Defendant appeals his jury conviction of 
negligent homicide, a dasr A misdemeanor, In 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 
(1978). We reverse the conviction. 
FACTS 
Defendant David R/Wardea, Jr., is a acc-
used and board-certified physician who 
began practical* family medicine in Kaysvffie, 
Utah, in. 1968, As part of his practice, defen-
dant provides obstetrical cue, and rsrimatas 
that be* has attended approximately 2500 
births, 300 of which have bees home ddive-
rieti* 
In September 1986, defendant was visited far 
his office' by Joanne Young, who consulted 
defendant because she was pregnant out-of-
wedlodt and wanted to have her baby at 
home. Joanne testified that she waa embarra- [ 
ssed about her pregnancy and 'didn't want to 
have to go to the hospital and have people 
know/ She also expressed a desire to keep the 
expenses of birth to a minimum. Defendant 
evaluated her for home delivery, considering 
the risks of her pregnancy, the proximity of 
hospital fatalities, and the availability of 
family supjwrt to care for the infant and 
mother after birth. Defendant determined that 
Joanne's piegnancy was low risk and that 
medical facilities were nearby. He also learned 
that Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the 
primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy had 
given birth at home to four of her seven chil-
dren. Based on -this evaluation, defendant 
decided that Joanne was a suitable candidate 
for home delivery and agreed to attend the 
'birth. He also made arrangements-to obtain 
Joanne's medical records from her previous 
doctor, and on the basis of that information 
and his own examination, calculated her deli-
very date to be in early December. 
On the morning of November 7, Joanne 
began experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ivy called 
defendant, who was in Salt Lake City at the 
time. Defendant expressed concern that labor 
was beginning and advised Ivy to confine 
Joanne to bed and to contact him immediately 
if the bleeding became heavier or if strong 
contractions began. That afternoon. Ivy called 
defendant again and told him that the Heeding" 
had stopped. She also toid him that she had 
spoken with the father of the child and that he 
had toid h«r that conception had occurred > 
month eartter than originally believed. Deffe* 
ndaxit testified that this information fed him to-
think that the labor was not premature, and 
he advised her to caD again aa labor contir 
iwed. Ivy did so that evening, lcpoitlng that 
Joanne was having occasional contractions^ 
Defendant toid her to call back when the 
contractions were three to Ave minutes apart. 
At about 10:15 p.m., Ivy informed defendant 
that the final stage of labor had begun. Def-
endant arrived at the house fifteen minutes 
later. 
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech birth 
to a male infant which appeared to be healthy* 
but weighed only an estimated four to five 
pounds. The baby exhibited some respiratory 
distress which defendant attributed^ prema-
turity. Defendant testified that he suggested 
hospitalization of the infant to Ivy, but that 
Ivy was concerned because there was no health 
insurance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied 
that she O'er discussed with defendant hospi-
talization of the infant.) Defendant instructed 
Ivy how to position the infant to relieve some 
of the respiratory distress and.showed Joanne 
how to morse the baby* He also instructed Ivy 
tp keep the child warm and to monitor the 
baby's temperature, cote, and broahing* 
After instructing Ivy to caS him if there were 
any changes in the baby's condition, defen-
dant left at about 11:30 p.nu 
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and the 
baby into a wanner room* Ivy noticed that the 
chUd's hands and feet were 'very blue/ but 
did not ca.il defendant. At 3:00 a.m.» the baby 
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appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy att-
empted to resuscitate him for about twenty 
minutest, and apparently the infant responded. 
She then called defendant's office, but was 
told he was at home. When Ivy called defen-
dant's home, his wife advised her he was not 
there, but would be in his office by 9:30 a.m. 
In neither call did she identify herself, leave a 
message, nor report that there was any emer-
gency. She apparently was aware defendant 
was not inaccessible in such a situation, but 
did^not make further attempts to reach him. 
She did not take the infant to the hospital or 
notify emergency services. She testified that in 
England, her native home, 'you would have 
had to have a. doctor's permission to have 
called an ambulance. " 
At about 8:30 sum.. Ivy called a friend but 
did not tell her that the cMd was having dif-
ficulty breathing. She also called her clerg-
yman, but did not advise him until 9:30 or 
10:00 a.m. that the baby was having respira-
tory difficulty. The clergyman called a local 
pediatrician, who arrived at the Youngs' home 
at about 10:30 ajn. only to find the infant 
'lifeless.* The baby was taken to a hospital, 
but was pronounced dead shortly after arrivaL 
A postmortem examination revealed that the 
infant was born approximately six to seven 
week* premature and had died from respira-
tory distress caused by prematurity of the 
lungs (hyaline membrane disease). Defendant 
subsequently was charged with one count of 
negligent homicide. 
An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial prior 
to the rendition of a verdict, A second jury 
trial was held February 22-26, 1988, and 
defendant was convicted as charged. Defen-
dant's motions to arrest judgment and for a 
new trial were denied. 
ISSUES 
Defendant raises essentially two issues on 
appeal* arguing, for a reversal of his convic-
tion. He first claims that the State's expert 
witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the 
applicable-medical standard of care. Second* 
he argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to establish that his conduct deviated signifi-
cantly from the applicable standard of care 
and-that there was a causal connection 
between hit conduct and the baby's death. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Conduct constituting the crime of negligent 
homidde occurs when an 'actor, acting with 
criminal negligence, causes the death of 
another.' Utah Code Ann* §76-5-206(2) 
(1978), The culpable mental state for criminal 
negligence require* 'only that a defendant 
'ought to be aware of a substantial and unj-
ustifiable risk' of death.' State v. Standiford, 
769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah 
Code Ami, §76.2-103(4) (1978)); see *lso 2 
C Toraa, Wharton's Criminal Law §168 
(14th ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[t]be nsk must 
be of such a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in aH the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint.* Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1978). Conseq-
uently, negligent homicide involves a defen-
dant's perception of risk and necessarily req-
uires an evaluation of his or her state of mind. 
Stale v. Wessendorf, Til P.2d 523, 525-26 
(Utah 0 . App. 1989). Whether a defendant 
negligently fails to perceive the risk is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. See State v. Howard, 
597 P.2d 878, 881^Utah 1979). However, the 
risk of death "must be of such a degree that 
an ordinary person would not ... fail to reco-
gnize i t / State v. Dyer, 671 PJd 142, 14* 
(Utah 1983). 
Because the "failure to perceive the risk 
constitutes a gross deviation from the reaso-
nable man standard/ ordinary negligence 
adequate in die civil law is insufficient to 
constitute criminal negligence. Stare Y* 
Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1979); see 
a/so Standiford, 769 PJ2d at 267; 2 CTorcia, 
Wharton's Criminal Law §168 (terms such aa 
"criminal negligence" are intended u> connote 
deviations from reasonableness significantly 
greater in degree than ordinary negligence)^ 
Thus* "tmlere inattention or mistake in judg-
ment resulting even in death of another i*. no* 
criminal unless the quality of the act makes it, 
s o / People Y. Rodriguez* 186 CaL. App. 2d 
433,8 CaL Rptr. 863,868 (1960% 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Defendant contends that expert testimony 
was required in this case to establish the 
"standard of care," but that the State's 
medical experts were not qualified to testify. 
On the other hand, the State argues that 
expert medical testimony was not required^ 
and that it needed only to present "competent 
evidence to show the nature and degree of risk 
and the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint/ The State correctly obs-
erves that the "standard of care" in section 76-
2-103(4) refers to the actor's mental state; at 
opposed to medical malpractice cases in which: 
expert medical testimony is required to show 
the applicable standard of medical care. Sxt 
&*, Chadwkk Y. NWsea, 763 P.2d 817, 821 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). It is also true that 
expert testimony t$ not required to prove the 
mental state of a criminal defendant accused 
of homicide. See State v. Nkhoisoa, 585 PJd 
6 # 63 (Utah 1978). 
We conclude; however, that expert testi-
mony was required in this case since such 
testimony was necessary to establish the nature 
and degree of risk. Section 76-5-206(1) 
requires the State to prove beyond a- reason-
able doubt that defendant's judgment was 
criminally deficient because he failed to pcrc* 
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exve a substantial risk that death could occur. 
Without an understanding of the nature and 
degree of risk, the jury could not determine 
whether the risk was substantial, and if so, 
whether defendant's failure to perceive it was 
grossly negligent. Unless the risk is one within 
the common knowledge and experience of 
laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury could 
make an informed determination of culpabi-
lity.2 We believe that expert testimony is req-
uired where criminal negligence is alleged and 
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the 
kea of the average layperson. See, e.g.t 
Kctchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934 
(W.D.N.Y. 1976) (State's, use of expert 
medical testimony at trial supplied sufficient 
evidence of criminal negligence for negligent 
homicide conviction iri death of mother on 
whom physician had performed legal abor-
tion). 
Defendant argues- that the State's expert 
medical witnesses did not qualify as experts 
because they do not attend home deliveries. 
The witnesses included two obstetrician/ 
gynecologists, a pediatrician, and a neonatol-
ogist* Citing the medical malpractice case of 
Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 
(Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school of 
medicine is not competent to testify as- an 
expert against the practitioner of another 
school), defendant argues that the State's 
doctors were not qualified to testify because 
they were of a different school of medicine 
than defendant. 
Hie qualification of an expert witness ia a 
matter within the sound discretion, of the trial 
court. State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 
(Utah 1986). There was evidence in the record 
that there is no board certification or recogn-
ized medical specialty in home delivery. There 
was also evidence that the medical principles 
applicable to the delivery of babies are appli-
cable whether a birth occurs at home or in a 
hospital. In view of the record evidence, the 
trial court was within its discretion to qualify 
the State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf. 
Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and 
procedures of general plastic surgeon were 
shown to be identical to those of specialized 
plastic surgeon, one may testify against the 
other); Wessd v. Erickson Landscaping C&* 
711 PJd 250, 253 (Utah 1985) (nothing prec-
ludes testimony from expert in another trade if 
the standard is the same for, both). 'The crit-
ical factor in determining the competency of 
an expert is whether that expert has knowledge 
that can assist the trier of fact in resolving-the 
issues before i t / Id. at 253; see alsoJQtato JL 
EvicL 702. We conclude that the trial court 
committed no abuse of discretion in allowing 
the State's experts to testify. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that the evidence prese-
nted was insufficient to establish guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. To convict a person of 
violating section 76-5-206(1), the State must 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, both 
prohibited conduct and a qulpable mental 
state. To establish a culpable mental state, the 
prosecution must present evidence that defe-
ndant was unaware of a substantia/ and unj-
ustifiabfa risk of death, but should have been 
so aware. 
We review defendant's claim under a stan-
dard that does not permit us to substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury in a criminal 
trial* See State v. To/man, 775 P.2d 422* 424 
(Utah a . App. 19S9). Rather, 
we review the evidence and all inf-
erences which may reasonably be 
draw from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improb-
able that reasonable minds must 
haw entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
Stare r. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Petrce, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Hopkins, 
119Utalt Adv. Rep. 59,60(1989). 
Defendant testified at trial that the grand-
parents weighed the newborn baby and dete-
rmined it to be about five pounds.. Defendant 
also sakl he believed the baby to be two to 
three weeks premature. Defendant was aware 
that the baby was having 'grunting respirat-
ions,* which he said was a sign of early resp-* 
iratory distress syndrome. Defendant positi-
oned the baby in such a way that the labored 
breathing was relieved. He further testified 
that the severity of the respiratory distress did 
not indicate a need for hospitalization. He 
said that he informed Ivy that the baby waa. 
premature and had difficulty in breathing, but 
that the baby was then stable. He instructed 
Ivy to call him if there was any change and 
admitted that he was depending on- Ivy to 
carefully watch the infant. Before leaving the 
Young residence, defendant noted that the 
respiratory difficulty had subsided He stated* 
'The baby was respiring wefl*. the-baby waa 
still awake and alert and musde tone waa stiff 
good^He also said, 
I was i^mpressed that the baby had 
already shown some signs of resp£ 
ratory distress syndrome* but under 
similar tircumstances in the, past* I 
have left babies at home^. having 
instructed the mother'on- how-to 
nurses having instructed the mother 
to- keep the baby warm, and there* 
fore I felt I could leave, confident 
that grandma would ca&me, conf-
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ident that if there were any progr-
ession of symptoms that I would be 
called. 
Defendant later testified that of 300 home 
births he had attended, approximately ten of 
those babies had been premature. Eight of 
those had had respiratory distress, but defen-
dant said that he had hospitalized only three 
of those eight. In the case of this infant, def-
endant testified that "in my experience and the 
judgment that I applied at the time based on 
experience with babies who are even smaller 
than this delivered at home, they can in many 
cases get along very, very well.... * 
The State's expert medical witnesses testi-
fied that although the mother and baby 
"would do better* in a hospital, defendant's 
evaluation of the infant's well-being would 
indicate that the baby's vital signs were 
"acceptable." They conceded that the infant 
may have survived had he been hospitalized up 
to ten hours after birth, but believed that 
leaving the baby at home was "bad judgment" 
on defendant's part.3 
The State's neonatologist testified that 
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive 
disease. He also indicated that a baby in the 
condition of the deceased is typically "at high 
risk for medical and surgical problems*" As 
far as mortality for an infant with the disease,, 
however, he stated that the failure to provide 
therapy would only-place the- probability of 
death at five to-fifteen percent. He later stated 
upon cross-examination that statistically only 
two pqceut of babier d k from untreated 
hyaline membrane disease. He further said, 1 
guess the message is i fs very unusual and rare 
to lose a baby at this gestation and this birth 
weight from hyaline membrane disease. •" 
Asked whether it would be outside the 
medical standard of care to have the family of 
a home-delivered newborn to monitor any 
change* in the baby's condition, the neonat-
ologist believed' it was, but conceded that 
other-competent physicians would disagree 
with him- This response merely-reinforces our 
conclusion that his testimony, as wefl a* that 
of the other experts for the State, must be 
construed, in light of the fact that home deli-
very, though legal, is not a widespread prac-
tice by doctors in Utah. The State's experts 
testified that the medical community in this 
state does not teach or train physicians for 
home delivery and generally recommends 
against it. 
We are convinced that even looking at the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, that evidence was "sufficiently inco-
ndusive" to establish that there was a substa-
ntial and unjustifiable risk of death such that 
defendant should have been aware of it. Thus, 
reasonable minds could examine the evidence 
presented and entertain *a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." See Booker, 709 
P.2dat345. 
Since we conclude that the evidence failed to 
establish criminal negligence, we need not 
reach the issue whether defendant's acts or 
omissions were the legal cause of death. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
1. J. Robert BuOodc Senior District Judge, sitting 
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
2» This is distinct from expert testimony- as to the 
subjective intent of the defendant, i.e., 'the actor'» 
viewpoint,9 which need not be accepted by the court 
and which is ultimately a determination for the jury. 
3. Our research has revealed very few cases in which 
licensed physicians have been charged with negligent 
homicide. In many of those cases where such a 
charge has been brought, albeit under differing 
statutes, the courts have held that no criminal liab-
ility attaches when death results from an error of 
judgment See generally Annotation* Homicide 
Predicated on Improper Treatment of JDtotse or 
Zzyury, 45 AXJUd 114(1972). 
GREENWOOD, Jidge: (< 
dissenting 
I concur in Judge Bench's opation "concer-
ning expert testimony, but dissent from the 
opinion's conclusion that there was* not suff-
icient evidence to sustain the jury's-conviction 
of negligent homicide. The majority opinion 
correctly states the necessary Quantum of evi-
dence for negligent homicide as being where 
the defendant should have bees aware of a 
substantial and unjustified risk: of death; but 
was not. Stste v. Wcssendorf, 777 P.2d 523, 
525 (Utah <X App. 1989), Also, the risk must 
be such that an ordinary person- would not, 
disregard or fail to recognize it- Slate vrDyer, 
671 P.2d 142, 143 (Utah 1983). Therefore, in 
this case, the State was required to convince 
the jury that there was- a substantial and unj-
ustified risk that the infant^wouid die if he did 
not receive medical care in a hospital-type 
setting; that defendant was unaware that the 
risk existed; and that an ordinary* person in 
defendant's position would have recognized 
that risk. Our task as an appellate court, is'to 
determine if'the evidence presented^ whet* 
viewed favorably to the jury verdict *ls suff-
iciently inconclusive or Inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds o u s t halve entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant commi-
tted the crime of which, he wa* convicted*? State 
v." Booker,' 709T P.2d~~342, 1 4 5 (Utah 
19S5) (quoting State V. Petiee, 659 P3& 443, 
444(1983)); 
My assessment of the evidence supporting 
the jury verdict is as follows: defendant was a 
licensed physician who- had maintained a 
family practice since 1968, including obstetr-
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
46 State v. Warden 122 Utah Adv Rep. 42 CODE* CO Pnm>. Utah 
icai care; defendant assumed responsibility for 
the infant's physical well-being by agreeing 
to deliver it at home; defendant did not insist 
on examining the mother when she reported 
vaginal bleeding to determine if premature 
birth was likely or if so, what precautions 
should be taken to minimize the likelihood of 
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the 
infant after birth as having Respiratory Dist-
ress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to 
position the infant in a way which relieved the 
symptoms but would not allev&te the condi-
tion itself; defendant minimized the serious-
ness ef the infant's condition to Ivy and 
Joanne; three of the ten children he had deli-
vered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant 
could die from the disease and that the disease 
was progressive; defendant could not himself 
admit the infant into a hospital because he 
lacked malpractice insurance, so would have 
to call another physician or have the infant 
admitted through an emergency room facility; 
Ivy testified that defendant only told her to 
watch the infant for changes in his tempera-
ture, color and respiration, without advising 
her as to the degree of change which might 
indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or 
Joanne that death could result from the 
disease; and defendant left the infant in the 
care of laypersons. 
There was other, conflicting evidence which 
wpuld indicate that dffmdant should not have 
been aware that a substantial risk existed. 
However, the existence of conflicting evidence, 
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury 
verdict. Sute v. Tohaum, 775 P.2d 422, 424-
25 (Utah CL App. 1989). The jury has been 
through the arduous task of listening to and 
assctting the evidence presented in this most 
difficult case, and I do not think that we 
should appropriately substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was 
based on what defendant knew or the jury 
believed he knew at the time, and its assess-
ment that given that knowledge he should 
have known the risks. I do not find the evid-
ence 'sufficiently inconclusive,* as do my 
colleagues, to justify conviction. I would 
conclude that the record, while heatedly con-
troverted, contains sufficient evidence for the 
jury to conclude that defendant should have 
been aware that a substantial and unjustified 
risk of death existed, and to convict defendant 
of negligent homicide as a result. 
Pamela T. Greenwood* Judge 
Gte M 
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BILLINGS, Judge? 
Regional Sales. Agency, Inc. ('Regional') 
appeals from a jury verdict awarding it 
5792.18 in damages as a result- of cross-
appellant Roland Reichert's ('Mr. Reichert') 
breach of a non-competition agreement with 
Regional, his former employer. Regional also 
appeals the trial court's reduction of its atto-
rney fees which Regional claims were provided 
for by the parties' written contract and reas-
onably incurred in prosecuting this action. 
Mr. Reichert cross-appeals the court's 
denial of his attempt to amend his counterc-
laim to add a claim for unpaid commissions 
and salary. We reverse and remand in. part* 
and affirm in part. 
Since the late 1950s, Edward and Helen 
Kihoim have operated a small family business 
which acted as a manufacturer's representative 
in riesisinatrd territories of the mountain west. 
The business earned commissions from iU 
principal manufacturers by selling their good* 
to retailers. 
In 1577* the Kiholms hired Mr. Reichert aa 
an independent contractor to handle outside 
saks~ If the relationship was satisfactory, the 
Kiholms Intended to retire in ten years with 
Mr. Reichert taking, over the business. Mr. 
Reichert worked for the Kiholms until 1978 
when the business was incorporated as Regi-
onal. 
In 1979, Mr. Reichert entered into a written 
employment contract with Regional. The 
employment contract contains a nou-
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